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Abstract
This study aimed to investigate temporally extended self-awareness (awareness of one’s 
place in and continued existence through time) in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), using 
the delayed self-recognition paradigm (DSR; Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux, 1996).  
Relative to age and verbal ability matched comparison children, children with ASD 
showed unattenuated performance on the DSR task, despite showing significant 
impairments in theory-of-mind task performance, and a reduced propensity to use 
personal pronouns to refer to themselves.  The results may indicate intact temporally 
extended self-awareness in ASD.  However, it may be that the DSR task is not an 
unambiguous measure of temporally extended self-awareness and it can be passed 
through strategies which do not require the possession of a temporally extended self-
concept.       
Keywords: Autism spectrum disorder; metarepresentation; self-awareness; self-concept; 
self-recognition; theory-of-mind.  
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Delayed self-recognition in children with autism spectrum disorder
A number of studies, using a variety of paradigms, suggest that aspects of self-awareness 
are diminished and/or atypical in autism spectrum disorder (ASD).  For instance, 
individuals with ASD have difficulty identifying and reflecting on their own mental states 
(Frith & Happé, 1999), as well as their own emotions (Ben Shalom, Mostofsky, Hazlett, 
Goldberg, Landa, Faran, McLeod, Hoehn-Saric, 2006; Gaigg & Bowler, 2008; Hill, 
Berthoz, & Frith, 2004).  At a more basic level, a specific difficulty amongst children 
with ASD with using personal pronouns such as “me” and “you” to label self and others 
suggests a diminished ability to explicitly differentiate themselves from other selves 
(Jordan, 1989; Kanner, 1943; Lee, Hobson, & Chiat, 1994).
However, not all aspects of self-awareness are impaired in ASD.  Many have 
argued that the “litmus test” of explicit, conceptual self-awareness is mirror self-
recognition (Amsterdam, 1972; Gallup; 1970).  The mirror self-recognition task involves   
covertly marking a child’s face with a spot of rouge and then presenting them with a 
mirror.  An objective representation of self is ascribed to any child who touches the rouge
upon seeing their reflection.  Typically developing children pass this task at 
approximately 18 months of age (Anderson, 1983; Courage, Edison, & Howe, 2004; 
Lewis & Ramsey, 2004) and a number of studies have demonstrated that children with 
ASD are capable of mirror self-recognition at a mental age of 18 months (Dawson & 
McKissick, 1984; Ferrari & Matthews, 1983; Neuman & Hill, 1978; Spiker & Ricks, 
1984).  This demonstrates that children with ASD detect the equivalence between the 
currently perceived mirror self-image and their represented bodily self-image (Povinelli, 
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2001).  Thus, even relatively developmentally immature children with ASD appear to
possess accurate mental representations of what they look like – they have own-body
concepts (but see Hobson, 1990; Loveland, 1993; and Mitchell, 1997, for alternative 
explanations).  
Further suggesting that individuals with ASD are aware of their physical selves,
Williams and Happé (in press) found that children with ASD could successfully 
discriminate between internally and externally caused changes in their perceptual 
experience.  These results suggest that individuals with ASD are self-aware of their 
agency. Thus, although some aspects of self-awareness are atypical in ASD, at least 
some elements appear to be intact.  However, a relatively under-researched question is 
whether individuals with ASD show temporally extended self-awareness.  
Temporally extended self-awareness involves awareness of one’s place in and 
continued existence through time (see Moore & Lemmon, 2001).  It is what allows me to 
recognise that “I am the same self that I was yesterday” (James, 1890/1950, p.332), 
providing a sense of personal continuity through time.  Temporally extended self-
awareness is likely to depend on certain representational abilities as well as aspects of 
temporal understanding.  The fact that the temporally extended self-concept incorporates 
multiple representations of past, present, and future states of self suggests that it takes the 
form of a metarepresentational structure (Povinelli, 2001). Metarepresentation enables an 
individual to entertain multiple, and possibly contradictory, representations of the same 
object or event, and understand them as (alternative) representations of that object or 
event (Perner, 1991).  In relation to temporally-extended self-awareness, 
metarepresentation may allow one to “organise previous, current and future 
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representations [of self] under a temporally extended metaconcept of ‘me’” (Povinelli, 
2001, p.87).  Through metarepresentation, therefore, alternative representations of self 
could be understood as alternative instances of a single self that persists through time.  
Temporally extended self-awareness may also presuppose a concept of the 
“causal arrow of time” – a conception of time as a sequence of chronologically ordered, 
causally related episodes (Povinelli, Landry, Theall, Clark, & Castille, 1999).  
Metarepresentation allows one to represent multiple states of self from different time 
points.  However, a degree of temporal understanding may be required to understand the 
temporal-causal connections between these states of self, and this is essential for 
temporally extended self-awareness.  
Given the possible cognitive underpinnings of temporally extended self-
awareness, there are grounds for predicting that individuals with ASD will have 
attenuated temporally extended self-awareness.  For example, it is established that 
children with ASD have difficulties with metarepresentation (e.g., Happé, 1995) and with 
aspects of temporal cognition (Boucher, Pons, Lind, & Williams, 2008).  Boucher et al. 
found that children with ASD were significantly impaired in their ability to represent and 
understand changes over time.  Specifically, they found that children with ASD had 
difficulty (a) with envisaging the past and future stages of a current situation, (b) with 
representing qualitative changes across time, and (c) with representing a series of 
subordinate events as comprising a unified whole event spanning the component stages.  
Accordingly, children with ASD may be less able than children without ASD to consider 
multiple, alternative representations of the self from different time points and to 
Delayed self-recognition in autism spectrum disorder 6
understand the temporal-causal relations among these past, present and future states of 
self, resulting in diminished temporally extended self-awareness.  
In typical development, temporally extended self-awareness has been assessed 
with the delayed self-recognition (DSR) paradigm (Povinelli, Landau, & Perilloux,
1996).  In this test, the experimenter and child are filmed playing a distractor game, 
during which the child is patted on the head in praise.  Whilst praising the child, the 
experimenter covertly places a large sticker on top of their head.  After a delay of three 
minutes, the pair watch the recording of the distractor game, including the sticker 
placement, and the child’s reaction is assessed.  Successful performance, like mirror self-
recognition, involves mark-directed behaviour – reaching up to touch or remove the 
sticker. 
The test is supposed to establish whether the child understands the temporal-
causal relation between their “past self” (represented on the screen) and their “present 
self” (currently watching the video image).  According to this logic, individuals who 
possess a temporally extended self-concept should expect the sticker to be on their head 
here-and-now (i.e., when watching the video recording) not just there-and-then (i.e., in
the video recording).  Typically developing children pass the task at around 4 years of 
age (Povinelli et al., 1996; Suddendorf, 1999; Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 1999),
during the same developmental period in which metarepresentation (Perner, 1991) and an 
understanding of the causal arrow of time (Povinelli et al., 1999; McCormack & Hoerl, 
2007) emerges. During the DSR task, children are also asked to name their video image.  
Children below 4 years of age show a greater tendency to label their image using their 
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proper name rather than the pronoun “me”, and this tendency is associated with failing to 
show mark-directed behaviour (Povinelli et al., 1996).
The aim of the current study was to assess temporally extended self-awareness in 
ASD using the DSR paradigm.  There has been one previous investigation of DSR in 
ASD, summarised in a book chapter by Nielsen, Suddendorf and Dissanayake (2006).  A
sample of 15 children with high functioning ASD and 15 mental age matched comparison 
children aged 5 to 9 years was assessed.  Whilst all of the comparison children passed the 
task, 83%1 of the children with ASD were found to pass.  However, no statistics or 
methodological details were reported making interpretation of these results difficult.  
On the basis of previous research, indicating ASD-specific impairments in 
metarepresentation and temporal cognition, it was predicted that children with ASD in 
the present study would show diminished performance on the DSR task.  It was also 
predicted that children with ASD would show an increased propensity to use their proper 
names as opposed to the pronoun “me” to label their video self-images.  Previous 
research has indicated that even fairly verbally able children with ASD show an elevated 
tendency to use their proper names when naming photographs (Lee et al., 1994).  The 
same pattern is, therefore, likely to apply to video images.  Finally, the relation between 
performance on the DSR task and a false belief task was explored, since both are thought 
to rely on the capacity for metarepresentation.  
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Method
Participants
Approval for this study was obtained from the appropriate university ethics committee.  
Participants were recruited through schools located in South-East England.  The parents 
of all participants gave their informed, written consent for their children to take part.  
The ASD and comparison groups each consisted of 30 participants who were 
individually matched on chronological age (CA) and verbal mental age (VMA), as 
assessed with the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 
1997).  Participant characteristics are presented in Table 1.
[Place Table 1 about here]
The groups did not differ significantly in terms of VMA, t(58) = -0.13, p = .90, r = .02; 
CA, t(53.29) = 0.25, p = .81, r = .03; or verbal IQ, t(55.00) = -0.99, p = .33, r = .13.  
All of the children/adolescents in the ASD group attended specialist autism 
schools or units.  A thorough review of their Statements of Special Educational Needs 
confirmed that they had received formal diagnoses from qualified clinicians of Autistic 
disorder (n = 23) or Asperger’s disorder (n = 7), according to the criteria set out in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994).  The comparison group consisted of children/adolescents with 
general learning disability of unknown origin (n = 14) and typically developing children 
(n = 16).  Any mention of social communication difficulties in any comparison child’s 
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Statement of Special Educational Needs resulted in exclusion from the comparison group, 
as this may have been indicative of ASD-related symptoms or even undiagnosed ASD.
Apparatus
The recording equipment used for the DSR task included a digital video camcorder,
which was connected to a 38cm flat-screen, colour monitor.  This equipment was used to 
record the distractor game and subsequently replay the recording of the game to the child.  
An additional video camera was used to record the entire session, the recordings from 
which were later used to code participant responses.  The two video cameras were 
positioned opposite the table at which the child was to be seated, approximately 1.5 to 2.5 
metres away.  The screen was also placed facing the table where the child was to be 
seated.  During the sticker game, the screen was covered with a piece of fabric to 
eliminate reflections.  
The materials used for the distractor game included two plastic cups, featuring
cartoon animal pictures (Donald Duck and Mickey Mouse), and a selection of children’s 
stickers.  Neon coloured sticky notes (3.8  5.1cm) were used to mark each child’s head.  
These were hidden, out of the child’s sight, on the back of the child’s chair.  
Procedure
The child was invited to play a distractor game in which they could win some stickers.  
Experimenter and child sat side-by-side at a table.  The experimenter told the child that 
she was going to record the game on video so that they could watch it back later.  She 
turned the cameras on and returned to her seat.   She then invited the child to choose a 
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sticker that they would like to win and then asked them to cover their eyes so that they 
could not see what she was doing.  She then hid the sticker under one of the cups.  She 
told the child that they could uncover their eyes and then gave them a simple clue 
indicating which cup the sticker was under.  For example, “It’s under the animal who’s 
wearing shoes.”  When the child had correctly guessed and retrieved the sticker from 
under the cup, the experimenter patted the child on the head in praise (sham marking).  
On the third round of the game, when the time came to pat the child on the head, the 
experimenter reached for a sticky note from the back of the child’s chair and 
surreptitiously placed it on top of their head, near the front of their hair.  The child was 
then given an unrelated filler task (they were asked to draw a picture of their choice),
which lasted three minutes.  The experimenter then told the child that it was time to 
watch themselves on television.  They watched the playback together on a monitor and 
this was filmed by the second video camera in order to record the child’s reactions to the 
image.  The video was replayed to the child from the second round of the distractor 
sticker game.  The experimenter ensured that they paid attention throughout.  Before the 
marking event, the child was asked, “Who’s that?” (pointing to their image on the 
screen).  If they did not give a response they were asked, “Can you tell me who that is?” 
(pointing to their image on the screen).  
If the child had not spontaneously removed the sticker within five seconds of 
seeing the marking event, they were given Prompt 1: “What’s that?” (pointing to the 
image of the sticker on the screen).  If they did not respond, the experimenter gave them 
Prompt 2: “I think it’s a sticker. Can you get that sticker for me?”   If the child was 
unable to locate the sticker after these prompts, they were shown live video feedback of 
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themselves on the same screen.  Prompts 1 and 2 were once again used.  Live video 
feedback acted as a control procedure to ensure that participant’s who failed DSR were 
doing so because of difficulty with delayed self-recognition rather than difficulty with 
self-recognition per se.   
The children also completed a standard unexpected contents – “Smarties” – false 
belief task (Perner, Frith, Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). The Smarties task was implemented
because it provides an assessment of mental state understanding in self, as well as others.  
In this task, participants are asked test questions about their own previous false beliefs as 
well as the false beliefs of another person.
Reliability 
An independent rater was trained to code performance on the DSR task, according to the 
level of prompting required to elicit mark-directed behaviour, as well as verbal responses.  
The second rater re-scored 17 of the videos.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed using 
Cohen’s Kappa, the value ( = .91) of which indicated “almost perfect agreement” 
(Landis & Koch, 1977). Disagreements were resolved through discussion.   
Data Analysis and Scoring
The data from the DSR task were analysed in a number of different ways.  Firstly, group 
differences in the number of children who showed mark-directed behaviour at any point
during the delayed video playback period were analysed.  Secondly, the amount of 
prompting required to elicit mark-directed behaviour was considered.  It has been 
suggested (D. Povinelli, personal communication) that spontaneous and prompted mark-
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directed behaviour may index different underlying abilities.  Whereas spontaneous mark-
directed behaviour is most likely to indicate the presence of a temporally extended self-
concept, showing mark-directed behaviour after Prompt 2 (“I think it’s a sticker. Can you 
get that sticker for me?”) may be the consequence of a simple search strategy.  Hence, the 
child may reason: I’m being asked to find the sticker, therefore there must be one 
somewhere around here.  In the video it’s on my head so maybe I should check there.  In 
other words, individuals may be primed to search on their heads without understanding 
the causal connection between the past self represented on screen and their present self.  
Showing mark-directed behaviour after Prompt 1 (“What’s that?”) is unlikely to 
reflect such a simple search strategy, since it is not a directive.  Whilst the first prompt 
might serve simply to draw the child’s attention to the image of the previously un-noticed 
sticker, the second prompt may actually scaffold the child’s performance to a significant 
extent, encouraging mark-directed behaviour through a search strategy. 
DSR performance was also analysed as a continuous variable.  Continuous DSR 
scores were assigned as follows: if children showed mark-directed behaviour 
spontaneously they scored 3 points; after Prompt 1 they scored 2 points; after Prompt 2
they scored 1 point; and if they failed to show mark-directed behaviour at all during the 
delayed video feedback they scored 0 points.  
Given that directional hypotheses were proposed, unless otherwise stated, all p-
values reported are for one-tailed tests.  Effect sizes are reported in terms of r for 
continuous variables and phi () for categorical variables.
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Results
Results indicated that whereas every comparison participant showed mark-directed 
behaviour at some point during the delayed video playback period, only 25 (83.3%) of 
the 30 children with ASD did so.  This group difference was statistically significant, 
Fisher’s exact p = .03,  = .30.  
Of the five children with ASD who failed to show mark-directed behaviour during 
the delayed feedback period, only two responded by showing mark-directed behaviour 
when given live video feedback.  Thus, only 2/30 children with ASD could be said to 
have a specific difficulty with DSR. The three children who failed both delayed and live 
video self-recognition were excluded from subsequent analyses (except where noted).  
Thus, a total of 25/27 participants with ASD and 30/30 comparison participants showed 
mark-directed behaviour at some point during the delayed feedback period.  This group 
difference was not significant, Fisher’s exact p = .22,  = .20.  
The degree of prompting required to elicit mark-directed behaviour was 
considered next.  Table 2 provides a breakdown of DSR performance according to the 
level of prompting required to elicit mark-directed behaviour within each of the groups.  
[Place Table 2 about here]
Group differences in the number of children showing mark-directed behaviour 
spontaneously, after Prompt 1 and after Prompt 2 were analysed using a 2 (Group: 
ASD/comparison)  3 (DSR: spontaneously/after Prompt 1/after Prompt 2) Chi-square 
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test2.  This test revealed no significant group differences, ²(2, N = 55) = 2.68, p (two-
tailed) = .29,   = .22.  Thus, children with ASD were not significantly less likely than 
comparison children to spontaneously notice the sticker and show mark-directed 
behaviour when presented with delayed video feedback, and not significantly more likely 
to require Prompt 2 in order to elicit mark-directed behaviour.
DSR performance was also analysed as a continuous variable.  Group differences 
in continuous DSR scores were assessed using a Mann-Whitney test, which indicated 
non-significantly better performance in the comparison group (M = 2.13, SD = 0.86) than 
in the ASD group (M = 1.78, SD = 0.86), U = 320.00, z = -1.43, p = .07, r = .20.  
Participants’ verbal responses to the self-image naming question, “Who’s that?” 
were considered next (for the entire sample, including live video failers).  One child with 
ASD failed to respond and was excluded from the subsequent analysis. Within the ASD 
group, 8/29 (27.6%) children used their proper name.  This compared to only 2/30 (6.7%) 
children in the comparison group.  All remaining children used the pronoun “me”.  The 
association between group and response to the naming question was significant, Fisher’s 
exact, p = .04,   = .28.  
Since only two participants failed to show mark-directed behaviour during the 
DSR task, it was not viable to statistically assess the association between DSR 
performance and verbal responses.  However, it should be noted that one of these 
children failed to provide a verbal response and the other responded with the pronoun 
“me”.  Similarly it was not possible to analyse the relationship between DSR and false 
belief task performance.  The two children who did fail DSR also failed both the Smarties 
“self” and “other” questions.  
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In terms of performance on the false belief task (for the entire sample, including 
live video failers), two children with ASD, but no comparison child, failed the “reality” 
control question.  Of the remaining 28 children with ASD, 14 (50%) passed the other-
person false belief question, compared to 24/30 (80%) comparison participants.  This 
difference was significant, ²(1, N = 58) = 5.77, p = .02,   = .32.  Nineteen out of 28 
(67.9%) participants with ASD passed the own false belief question, compared to 26/30 
(86.7%) comparison participants.  This difference only approached significance, ²(1, N
= 58) = 2.95, p = .08,   = .23.
Discussion
Contrary to predictions, the results of this study demonstrated undiminished DSR
performance amongst children with ASD relative to age and verbal ability matched 
comparison children.  Once children who failed live self-recognition were excluded from 
the analysis, no significant differences between the groups were observed in terms of the 
numbers of children showing mark-directed behaviour during the delayed feedback 
period. Overall, only two out of 30 children with ASD were found to have a specific
difficulty with delayed self-recognition.  These results are consistent with those obtained 
by Nielsen et al. (2006), who also found that the majority of children with ASD passed 
the DSR task.
When the degree of prompting required to elicit mark-directed behaviour was 
considered, it was found that children with ASD were neither significantly less likely 
than comparison children to show spontaneous mark-directed behaviour, without the 
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need for verbal prompting, nor significantly more likely to require Prompt 2 (“I think it’s 
a sticker.  Can you get that sticker for me?”) to demonstrate mark-directed behaviour.
Thus, the high rate of mark-directed behaviour in the ASD group could not be attributed 
to the use of a simple search strategy elicited by Prompt 2.  Furthermore, when DSR 
performance was considered as a continuous variable, the group difference only 
approached significance.  
It is important to contrast the unattenuated DSR task performance amongst 
participants with ASD in the current study with their significant impairments in the use of 
personal pronouns and in metarepresentational ability.  Relative to comparison 
participants, participants with ASD were significantly more likely to respond with their 
proper names, rather than the pronoun “me”, when asked to label their video image.  This 
observed difficulty with pronoun use is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Lee et al., 
1994) and implies diminished self-awareness in a proportion of children with ASD.  
Children with ASD were also impaired in their capacity for metarepresentation, relative 
to comparison participants. Indeed, the percentage of children with ASD in the current 
study who passed the other-person test question of the unexpected contents false belief 
task (50%) was closely comparable to previous studies assessing participants with ASD 
of similar developmental levels (e.g., Fisher Happe, & Dunn, 2005). This demonstrates 
that false belief task performance in the current study was representative of the 
performance of children with ASD of this ability range in general, making the lack of a 
significant group difference on the DSR task even more striking.  
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Despite the fact that the current study showed DSR performance to be intact in 
ASD, it may be premature to draw the conclusion that temporally extended self-
awareness is, therefore, unimpaired in ASD.  Firstly, it must be acknowledged that 
neither the current study nor the study by Nielsen et al. (2006) addressed the question of 
whether children with ASD would show DSR at the appropriate chronological age of 
four years (the youngest child in the current study was five years old).  Indeed, it seems 
likely that a certain level of cognitive ability is necessary for successful DSR.  Thus, any 
four year old child who is cognitively delayed, as many children with ASD are, may 
experience difficulties with the DSR task.  
Moreover, whilst some may consider the DSR task to be the litmus test for 
temporally extended self-awareness in typically developing children, the task is not 
unambiguously such a measure.  For example, Povinelli (2001) argues that DSR may be 
achieved without a temporally extended self-concept, through alternative cognitive 
mechanisms. He suggests that some children may simply detect the match between their 
mental representations of what they look like and the images presented to them on the 
television screen. Although there is a kinaesthetic mismatch, in that the movements of 
the video image of the child are not contingent with the current movements of the child 
themselves, there is a featural equivalence between the video image of the child and the 
child’s physical self-representation.  It may be that this featural equivalence is sufficient
to prompt mark-directed behaviour in the absence of a temporally extended self-concept.  
In other words, the child may recognise themselves in the video, without understanding 
that it is a representation of them as they were three minutes previously.  
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If it is possible for children to show mark-directed behaviour in the DSR task in 
the absence of a temporally extended representation of self, then the lack of a relationship 
between DSR and false belief task performance is unsurprising, with only the latter 
relying on metarepresentation.  It might also mean that some of the children in the current 
study who appeared to pass the task, in fact, lacked a fully developed temporally 
extended self-concept.  This might account for the ceiling effect and lack of a group 
difference in DSR performance observed in the current study.  
Moreover, there is indirect evidence to suggest that temporally extended self-
awareness may be impaired in ASD.  For example, individuals with ASD have impaired 
episodic memory (Bowler, Gardiner & Grice, 2000; also see Boucher & Bowler, 2008).  
Episodic memory is defined as memory for personally experienced events that occurred 
in a specific place at a specific time.  Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving (1997, p.349) argue that 
episodic retrieval involves the understanding that “the self doing the [re] experiencing 
now is the same self that did it originally”.  Thus, episodic memory difficulties in ASD 
may at least be partially attributable to an underlying impairment of temporally extended 
self-awareness (Lind & Bowler, 2008).  
Further research could clarify the issue of whether or not children with ASD pass 
the DSR task because they have temporally extended self-concepts.  Following the 
rationale of Povinelli and Simon (1998), children with ASD could be tested for DSR after 
both brief (3 minute) and extreme (7 day) delays.  If children with ASD show mark-
directed behaviour because they detect the featural match between their bodily self-
representation and the video self-image, they should do so when presented with
recordings after both short and long delays, since their physical features will remain
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largely invariant across both durations.  On the other hand, if they show mark-directed 
behaviour because they possess a temporally extended self-concept, they should only do 
so after a short delay. If they understand the temporal-causal relations between present 
and various past states of self, they should realise that the image recorded shortly before 
bears a fairly direct causal relation to their current self, whereas the image recorded a 
week before bears a far less direct causal relation to the current state of self and is, 
therefore, unlikely to be informative about the appearance of the current self (a sticker is 
unlikely to remain undiscovered on one’s head for a whole week!).  
Even if the validity of the (short delay) DSR paradigm as a measure of temporally 
extended self-awareness is questionable, the results of the current study still provide 
valuable insight into the nature of self-awareness in ASD.  They provide further evidence 
that most children with ASD are aware of their physical selves.  Nevertheless, it was a 
striking finding that three children with ASD (but no comparison child) failed live video 
self-recognition, apparently demonstrating a profound diminution of self-awareness.  In 
typical development, 90% of 3-year-olds pass live self-recognition (Suddendorf, 
Simmock, & Nielsen, 2007).  Thus, on the basis of the verbal mental ages of these 
children (2.83, 3.83, 3.42 years) one might reasonably expect them to pass.  
Finally, it should be highlighted that delayed self-recognition can, at best, only 
ever hope to directly assess awareness of the self’s physical continuity.  However, it is 
awareness of one’s mental continuity that is likely to be intimately related to higher 
cognitive functions such as episodic memory.  Perhaps this is the element of self-
awareness upon which further research efforts should be focussed.  
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Footnotes
(1) It is assumed that this is a typographical error, since this would mean that 12.45 
children with ASD passed.  
(2) The analysis was also run as a 2 (Group)  4 (DSR) test, including those children who 
failed to show mark-directed behaviour (n = 2).  However, the assumptions of Chi-square 
were violated and hence the Fisher’s exact statistic was appropriate.  This test also failed 
to indicate any significant group differences, Fisher’s exact = 4.56, p (two-tailed) = .17, 
= .30.
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Table 1
Participant Characteristics 
ASD (n = 30, 8 female) Comparison (n = 30, 10 female)
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range 
VMA (years) 6.18 (2.32) 2.83 – 11.33 6.26 (2.11) 3.17 – 10.83
CA (years) 8.99 (3.31) 5.00 – 16.17 8.74 (4.50) 3.58 – 15.67
Verbal IQ 79.10 (16.39) 46 – 117 83.90 (20.79) 39 – 117
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Table 2
DSR Performance 
Level of prompting ASD (% of group) Comparison (% of group)
Fail 2 (7.4%) 0 (0%)
Pass after Prompt 2 8 (29.6%) 9 (30.0%)
Pass after Prompt 1 11 (40.7%) 8 (26.7%)
Pass spontaneously 6 (22.2%) 13 (43.3%)
